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Digest: In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases 
Alicia Jessop 
Opinion by Moreno, J., expressing the unanimous view of the Court. 
Issue 
Does section 337(a) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 1 
preclude private claims based on state law requiring the labeling of food to 
disclose color additives in farm-raised salmon? 
Facts 
Plaintiffs filed a class and representative action alleging that grocery 
stores violated state law by selling farm-raised salmon without disclosing 
that it is artificially colored.2 Plaintiffs alleged potential health risks from 
the consumption of these additives used to make farmed salmon look like 
wild salmon, that federal and state laws required labeling disclosing their 
use, and that failure to disclose caused consumers to believe farmed salmon 
is wild salmon. 3 Plaintiffs brought four causes of action: (1) violation of 
the unfair competition law (UCL) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, section 17200 
et seq.); (2) unfair or deceptive trade practices under the Consumers Legal 
Remedies Act (CLRA) (Cal. Civ. Code, section 1750 et seq.); (3) violation 
of the false advertising law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, section 17500 et seq.; 
and ( 4) negligent misrepresentation.4 
Defendants demurred on several grounds, including that section 
337(a) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") preempted 
plaintiffs' state law claims because these state laws frustrated the purpose 
of Congress behind the FDCA. 5 The trial court agreed and sustained the 
demurrer.6 The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that, because Section 
337(a) explicitly bars private enforcement of the FDCA provisions under 
federal law, it must implicitly bar private state law claims imposing 
requirements identical to those in the FDCA. 7 The Supreme Court of 
1 21 U.S.C. § 301-399(a). All "Section" references in the text will hereafter refer to a section 
within the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act unless otherwise noted. 
2 In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Cal. 2008). 
3 Jd. 
4 Jd. at 1173-74. 
5 Jd. at 1174, 1177 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 337(a)). 
6 Jd. at 1174. 
7 Jd. at 1174, 1177. 
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California granted review. 8 
Analysis 
1. Section 343-1 Permits States to Adopt Identical Requirements 
The Court began by noting that Section 343(k) of the FDCA, which 
prohibits the misbranding of food, requires labels disclosing the presence of 
artificial coloring added to food. 9 Regulations promulgated under the 
FDCA require labels disclosing the addition of color additives to salmon. 10 
The Court then noted that Section 343-1 of the FDCA expressly 
preempts state and local law for the labeling of food traveling in interstate 
commerce and regulated under section 343(k) "that is not identical to the 
requirement of such section .... " 11 Thus, the Court concluded, under this 
provision states may establish their own labeling requirements that are 
identical to those contained in Section 343(k). 12 The Court noted that 
California's Sherman Law contains requirements for the labeling of food to 
disclose artificial coloring that are identical to Section 343(k) of the 
FDCA. 13 The Sherman Law also incorporates the FDA regulations 
regarding the disclosure of color additives in farmed salmon. 14 
The Court began with the presumption that state laws adopted 
pursuant to their police powers are not preempted unless that is the "clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress."15 But the Court noted that Congress 
had not expressly preempted the state law claims at issue, nor were these 
claims implicitly preempted as a result of Congress' intention to occupy the 
field or because compliance with both federal and state laws was 
impossible. 16 In determining whether these claims were preempted as an 
obstacle to the purposes of Congress, the Court reasoned that the words of 
Section 343-1 "clearly and unmistakably evince Congress's intent to 
authorize states to establish laws that are 'identical to' federal law." 17 
Given that California's Sherman Law contained requirements that were 
identical to the FDCA and incorporated its regulations, the Court concluded 
that "the state requirements at issue here are explicitly permitted by section 
343-1."18 
The Court said that congressional silence on the remedies available for 
violations of the state laws permitted under the FDCA indicated that 
8 !d. at 1174, 1184. 
9 !d. at 1174 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343(k)). 
10 !d. at 1174-75 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(c)(3), (d)(3), and (d)(4) (2007)). 
11 !d. at 1175 (quoting 21 U.S. C. § 343-1 (a)) (internal quotations omitted). 
12 !d. 
13 !d. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE§ 110740). 
14 !d. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE§ II OIOO(a), 21 C.P.R.§§ 73.35, 73.75 (2007)). 
15 !d. at 1176 (quoting Metronic, Tnc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
16/d.atll77. 
17 !d. at 1178 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343-1). 
18 /d. 
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Congress did not intend to preclude states from permitting private persons 
to enforce these laws. 19 The Court reasoned that, "[i]f Congress intended to 
permit states to enact identical laws on the one hand, but preclude states 
form providing private remedies for violations of those laws on the other 
hand," it would have said so in the text or in the legislative history. 20 
The Court also said that the legislative history shows that "the 
preemptive scope of Section 343-1 was to sweep no further than the plain 
language of the statute itself."21 The Court pointed to an uncodified 
provision in the amendments to the FDCA that indicated that state law was 
not to be preempted unless expressly preempted under Section 343-1.22 
The Court interpreted this provision to depict Congress's "considered 
decision to continue to allow states to provide such private remedies.'m 
Finally, the Court relied on the United States Supreme Court decisions 
finding that private suits to enforce state laws identical to federal laws were 
not preempted by federallaw. 24 
2. Section 337 Did Not Impliedly Preempt Plaintiffs Claims 
The Court then rejected defendant's argument that plaintiffs claims 
were precluded because they sought to enforce the FDCA in violation of 
Section 337.25 The Court argued that Section 337 was inapplicable because 
plaintiffs were not seeking to enforce the FDCA but state law.26 The Court 
also reasoned that Section 337 does not limit the ability of the states to 
provide private remedies for violations of their lawsY 
Holding 
The Court held that the FDCA did not preclude private actions to 
enforce state food labeling requirements identical to the FDCA. 28 Thus, the 
Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 29 
Legal Significance 
As a result of this decision, California citizens are not precluded from 
bringing private actions to enforce state food labeling requirements under 
California's Sherman Act. This decision broadens the potential liability for 
companies who are regulated by the Act. 
19 !d. 
20 !d. 
21 !d. at 1179. 
22 !d. (citing Pub.L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(l). 104 Stat. 2364, Nov. 8, 1990). 
23 !d. 
24 !d. at 1180-81 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)). 
25/d.atll84. 
26 !d. at 1181. 
27 !d. at 1182. 
28 !d. at 1184. 
29 !d. 
. ' :1' 
